EY builds five-member Oceania oversight council amid scrutiny
EY’s five-member Oceania Public Interest Council has three independent non-executives, but questions remain over investigative authority, evidence access, complaint handling and regulatory escalation.

Adjustments
- EY announced its five-member Oceania Public Interest Council on 4 November 2026.
- The council comprises three independent non-executives and two senior EY leaders.
- Allens conducted 14 Project Magenta interviews, mostly about 30 minutes each, all with senior partners or directors.
- In July 2026, KPMG confirmed evidence supporting the allegation that confidential Lendlease documents were kept in a Sydney office locker.
- Australia's Treasury released accounting, auditing and consulting integrity reform options in July 2026.
By Sophie Lindqvist
EY announced on 4 November 2026 that it would establish a five-member Oceania Public Interest Council, with three independent non-executives and two senior EY leaders, as Australia considers tougher governance rules for major accounting partnerships.
What does EY's new council change?
The council will provide external perspectives on EY Oceania governance, audit quality, professional standards and the public-interest effects of regional decisions. It will advise executive leadership on policy, strategy and public-interest duties, then publish an annual account of its work.
Sue Kench will chair. She spent almost 30 years at King & Wood Mallesons, including seven as global chief executive, and joined EY's Global Governance Council in November 2025. Named members also include EY Oceania managing partner and chief executive David Larocca and regional risk management and independence leader Leigh Walker.
Kench will develop the charter and operating arrangements while an executive search firm recruits two independent members. EY said the council will introduce “additional independent challenge” and support high-quality audits. That promise depends on powers the unpublished charter has yet to settle.
EY's initiative follows a global governance review and draws on the UK's Financial Reporting Council Audit Firm Governance Code, which requires major audit firms to involve independent non-executives in arrangements designed to protect audit quality and the public interest. The timing suggests preparation, not immunity: Australian regulators are examining whether partnership structures adequately manage conflicts, misconduct and accountability failures.
What did KPMG's oversight miss?
The KPMG Australia whistleblower case supplies the warning. The Department of Finance commissioned former senior public servant Dr Ian Watt to review KPMG's culture, ethics, integrity and governance. His October 2026 report said the firm mishandled the whistleblower's concerns and showed wider governance and accountability weaknesses.
KPMG already had policies, reporting channels and oversight bodies. They failed: management fragmented responsibility, did not combine warning signs and missed timely, coordinated decisions. Reviews by Principia Advisory and the Andrews Group also found weaknesses in ethical culture, whistleblower protection, accountability and challenging senior leaders.
KPMG has since appointed its first independent chair, increased board independence and strengthened ethics and whistleblower oversight. In October it announced a new Integrity Office, a whistleblower protection officer and conduct and disciplinary changes. Those changes followed leadership departures, client losses, parliamentary investigations and restrictions on new Commonwealth contracts.
How did directors oversee a limited inquiry?
In November 2024, KPMG chairman Martin Sheppard directed independent directors to send whistleblower approaches to general counsel Louise Capon despite allegations against senior personnel. KPMG engaged Ashurst and later cited it as external scrutiny. Ashurst told Parliament it had advised the firm and reviewed KPMG-specified matters, not the underlying misconduct.
KPMG gave Ashurst incomplete disclosure information. Its lawyers assessed the whistleblower's statutory protection without material KPMG already held. Concerned independent directors pushed for further scrutiny, and KPMG commissioned Allens to run Project Magenta in September 2025.
A board subcommittee led by deputy chair Carmel Mortell, with three independent directors, approved Project Magenta's scope and methodology. The Australian Financial Review later reported that directors had full, unrestricted investigative powers. Yet Allens conducted only 14 interviews, most lasting about 30 minutes, all with senior partners or directors.
Allens did not interview the whistleblower, junior audit-team members, affected clients or rival audit firms, or comprehensively search emails and digital records. It relied on its assessment of senior partners Eileen Hoggett, Paul Rogers and Kim Lawry to decide further interviews and searches were unnecessary.
The December 2025 report found KPMG partners shared confidential Lendlease information with the Westpac audit team without authorisation, likely breaching confidentiality duties. Allens called the broader allegation unsubstantiated and found no competitive advantage; KPMG later used those conclusions to defend its handling of the complaint.
In July 2026, KPMG confirmed Allens had found evidence that confidential Lendlease documents sat in a locker at its Sydney office. Investigators then found a photograph of confidential Lendlease board papers on former partner Kim Lawry's phone, exposing the cost of skipping digital checks.
When is an external inquiry independent?
Richard James, an investigator with more than three decades' experience, distinguished between “poor investigative execution” and flaws in “the design of an investigation.” Expertise cannot repair a defective mandate; senior figures can constrain an inquiry's scope, evidence, witnesses and questions.
Charles Cohen called a complaint's initial classification a critical decision. Treating misconduct as an employment grievance can divert attention from evidence, accountability and conflicts. In his examination of Big Four whistleblowing systems, financial regulation specialist Abdelhamid Taha said partnership incentives and internal power can defeat safeguards when evaluators face professional or commercial ties to those they assess.
What will Australia require?
Treasury's July 2026 options paper on accounting, auditing and consulting integrity proposes governance requirements for large audit firms, controls for multidisciplinary partnership conflicts and stronger audit surveillance. EY says its council matches its Treasury submission.
Partners combine ownership, professional duties and management authority, unlike listed-company shareholders. Their interests can intersect with partner discipline, client relationships, reputation and complaints against colleagues. Independent oversight helps only when its framework grants real authority.
What must EY's charter prove?
The unanswered questions are operational:
- Can it commission investigations without executive approval, set scope and require internal records?
- Can it hear whistleblowers directly and receive complaints and risk reports without management filtering?
- Can it challenge partner pay, discipline and audit independence?
- Can it escalate unresolved concerns to regulators or disclose public disagreement?
Until EY publishes the charter and shows the council exercising those powers, its majority independence remains design rather than demonstrated control. The test is not who receives the mandate. It is who controls what the body may know, investigate and disclose.
via Google News · Big Four (Source)
More from Sophie Lindqvist
Show full bio
Correspondent covering companies, deals and strategy in CPA News is a professional daily at CPA News.
7 articles
Linked entries
- PCAOB Creates Five Audit-Misconduct Units as Budget Falls 9.4%
- PCAOB creates five specialist enforcement units for misconduct probes
- Sri Lanka Bars Two EY Partners From Bank Audits After $41 Million NDB Fraud
- Alan Skelton Named GASB Chair; Kevin Smith Named Vice Chair
- FASAB reopens federal environmental cleanup liability rules